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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF U'TAH

RENNOLD PENDER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SALT
LAKE CITY, a public corporation, et
al.

No. 8469

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

PRELI:J.IINARY STATEMENT
The Supreme Court of the State of Ptah and the
Supreme Court of the -c nited States have both ruled
directly on the controlling principle of law which sets
at rest any factual matters claimed to be involved by
appellant. The trial court properly granted the Board of
Education's motion for summary judgment on the basis
of Railroad vs. Stringham, 38 Utah 113, 110 P. 868, and
Gonzales vs. French 164 U.S. 338, 17 S. Ct. 102 41 L.
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Ed. 458. These cases were cited below in defendant's
written brief but appellant has not mentioned them to
this court.
The statement of facts set forth by appellant is
incomplete but correct as far as it goes. The land
involved herein is a ten acre tract lying in the Northe.ast Quarter of Section 16, Township 1 South, Range 1
East, Salt Lake Meridian, and being situated west of
19th East Street and north of Kensington A venue in Salt
Lake City. The issue is whether or not the land was
reserved to the Territory of Utah for school purposes
under the Organic Act of 1850, so that title thereafter
passed to the State of Utah upon its admission to the
Union under the Enabling Act of 1894.
Defendant holds title under a patent from the State
of Utah (Abstract entries N'o. 25 and 83) while plaintiff's
recent application for federal patent was rejected. (R.
50-52) Plaintiff is the remote successor in interest of
an e.arly settler who, plaintiff contends, was possibly
in possession as early as 100 years ago and that the preemptive right of such settler has continued in effect to
the present day and now compels the State of Utah to
select other lands "in lieu'' of this particular tract. For
the convenience of the court, counsel for the defendant
has prepared a sununary of the abstract which is entitled
"Chain of Title" and is filed at pages 62 and 63 of the
Judgment Roll.
The n1ost pertinent fact ·which plaintiff refrains
from ~tating is that none of his predecessors in interest
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ever filed a declaratory statement under the pre-emption
laws of intention to obtain patent from the U.S.A. (R.
50, 51) The federal statutory law of pre-emption upon
which plaintifi relies makes such procedure a necessary
prerequisite in order that the settler's possessory claim
might be perfected and prevent title to the school lands
involved from passing to the State of Utah.
The parties will be referred to as the plaintiff (Rennold Pender) and the defendant (Board of Education
of Salt Lake City).
These parties are the only ones taking part in this
appeal. Romney Lumber Company deeded its interest
to the Board of Education (abstract entry No. 83) and
has taken no further action in connection with the lawsuit. The Board of Education was substituted as a party
defendant in place of Romney Lumber Company under
Rule 25 (c) U.R.C.P. Salt Lake County was originally
joined as a party defendant, but filed its Disclaimer.
The State of Utah was made a third party defendant by
Romney Lumber Company, but the issues framed by
such pleadings have become moot in view of the Decree
quieting the title of Board of Education of Salt Lake
City.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
TITLE TO THE TRACT INVOLVED PASSED FROM THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO THE STATE OF UTAH.
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POINT II.
PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION FOR PATENT FROM THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WAS REJE-CTED BY THE
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT AND THIS ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION IS BINDING UPON PLAINTIFF AND
UPON THIS COURT.
POINT III.
PLANTIFF CANNOT OBTAIN TITLE TO THE SCHOOL
SECTION BY ADVERSE POSSESSION AGAINST THE
UNITED STATES OR THE STATE OF UTAH.
POINT IV.
THE STATE PATENT TO ROMNEY LUMBER COMPANY AND PAYMENT OF' TAXES BY IT BARS PLAINTIFF FROM OBTAINING TITLE BY ADVERSE POSSESSION AGAINST SAID PATENTEE.
ARGlT~IENT

AND ArTliORITIES
POINT I.

TITLE TO THE TRACT INVOLVED PASSED FROM THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO THE STATE OF UTAH.

Defendant agrees with all the law cited in plaintiff's
brief to the effect:
'' . . . that if there is any genuine issue as to
any material fact, the motion (for summary judgment) should be denied." Young et al. YS. Felornia, Utah, ~lay 195~. ~-!-! P. 2d St)~, 863.
Plaintiff contends that there is an issue of fact
as to when John Prye or D. Hendrix first settled on
the land with a view to pre-en1ption. The official plat
of thP survC'y of Township 1 South, Range 1 East, Salt
Lake :Meridian, shows that it was filed with and accepted
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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by the Surveyor General for Utah on September 10,
1856. (R. 50, 51) On February 25, 1868 the Territorial
Surveyor certified that "John Poy (or Prye) is the lawful claimant of Lots 16 and 17." (Abstract Entry No.1)
However the Big Field Five Acre Plat (R. 66) introduced
into evidence by plaintiff states that it was:
"copied from Old Plot by Leo Hawkins, G.S.L.
Co. Recorder 1857"
and plaintiff claims that it is only reasonable to infer
that the owner as shown thereon of Lots 16 and 17,
Block 13 (D. I-Iendrix) was in possession prior to September 10, 1856, the date the official U.S. Survey was
filed. Plaintiff argues about the condition of the weather
in the fall of 1856, the meaning of the word "old" and
asks this court to gloss over the fact that there is no
deed of possession from D. Hendrix to John Prye. But
for the purpose of sustaining the motion for sun1mary
judgment, plaintiff's claim that D. Hendrix is his earliest
predecessor in title and that such person settled on the
land with a view to pre-emption prior to Septen1ber 10,
1856 may be assumed to be correct.
In any event the abstract shows: That hy mesne
conveyances the possessory interest of John Prye was
transferred to George Saxton and C. S. Patterson; that
in 1923 auditor's tax deeds to Salt Lake County were
issued for 1918 delinquent taxes; that in 1923 Salt Lake
County quitclaimed its interest to the State of Utah for
"no money" inasmuch as the Board of County Commis-
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sioners was advised that the property was "State Land
erroneously assessed." (R. 70) In 1943 the State patented
the property to Romney Lumber Company and in 1952
plaintiff acquired quitclaim deeds from the heirs of Saxton and Patterson. Plaintiff's complaint was filed May
6, 1952, two days before the one year grace period expired as provided for in the new four year statute of
limitations on tax titles.
The solution to this case does not depend upon the
date of earliest possession or any modern statute. It
is governed by the provisions of the statutes concerning
pre-emptive rights (Chapter 4, Title 32, Revised Statutes
of 1878) and the decisions of the Supreme Courts of
Utah and the United States construing the same. The
law is explicit that:
"Every claimant under the pre-emption law
. . . is required to make known his claim in writing to the register of the proper land-office within
three months from the time of the settlement ... "
Sec. 2265 Rev. Stat. 1878 ( 3 March 1843 ; 5 Stat.
620)
"In regard to settlements which are authorized upon unsurveyed lands, the pre-emption
claimant shall be in all cases required to file his
declaratory statement within three months from
the date of the receipt at the district land-office
of the approved plat of the township embracing
such pre-e1nption settlement." Sec. 2266, Rev.
Stat. 1878 (30 nfay 1SG2, 12 Stat. .JlO)
A~

stated in the affidavit of nir. Ernest E. House,
1\lanager of the Bureau of Land Management, Land Of-
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fice for Utah, the official tract book covering the Northeast Quarter of Section 16, Township 1 South, Range l
East, shows that none of plaintiff's predecessors in interest ever filed an application for homestead entry or
declar.atory staten1ent of pre-emptive claim. This affidavit is uncontroverted and under the two very pertinent decisions of Railroad vs. Stringham and Gonzales
1.:s. French, the failure of the pre-emptive claimant to file
his declaratory statement, caused the title to the section 16 tract, here involved, to be reserved to the Territory of Utah pursuant to the Organic Act of 1850. The
possessory claim of John Prye was not diligently prosecuted and failed to ripen into any type of title which
can now be asserted by plaintiff.
In the settlement scheme of the western states, the
first settler upon the land who was the head of a family
and who erected a dwelling house and improved and
inhabited such premises had a preference right to purchase and acquire patent to 160 acres upon paying the
prescribed fee and filing his claim under the pre-emption
laws. (Chapter 4, title 32, Revised Statutes of 1878) The
statutes establishing pre-emptive rights date back at
least to !1.arch 3, 1803 ( 2 Stat. 229) and recognized the
elaim to possession of the first person to inhabit and improve the lands lying along the western frontier. The
homestead entry may, but need not have been based on
such prior inhabitation. The pre-mnptive claimant was
offered first chance to buy the land to protect his investments and improvements, etc.
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In 1841, Congress re-enacted the laws on pre-emption and provided in section 10 :
" ... no lands reserved for the support of schools
. . . shall be liable to entry under and by virtue
of the provision of this act." (Sept. 4, 1841, 5
Stat. 456)
This of course raised a problem, for the early pioneers were settling upon the land well in advance of any
public survey and no one knew whether in fact they were
located upon land which after government survey was
accomplished might turn out to be section sixteen or
thirty-six. In 1859 Congress passed a provision to alleviate this situation, but in the meantime the Territory
of Utah was created by the Organic Act (9 Stat. 453;
published at page 80, volume 1, U.C.A. 1953) Section 15
of this act provided :
"That when the lands in the said Territory
shall be surveyed under the direction of the Government of the United States, preparatory to
bringing the same into market, sections numbered
sixteen and thirty-six in each township in said
Territory shall be, and the same a're hereby, reserved for the purpose of being applied to schools
in said Territory, and in the States and Territories hereafter to be erected out of the same."
On this same day Congress passed a similar statute
which stated:
"Sections numbered sixteen and thirty-six, in
each township of the territories of New Mexico,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Utah, Colorado, Dakota, Arizona, Idaho, Montana
and Wyoming shall be reserved for the purpose
of being applied to schools in the several Territories herein named, and in the States and Territories hereinafter to be erected out of the same."
(9 Stat. 452; Sec. 1946, Rev. Stat. 1878)
Subsequently, in 1891 sections 2 and 32 in each townshig
were added to this proviso ( 26 stat. 796; Republished
in 43 U.S.C.A. Sec. 853.)
Also in 1891 ( 3 March 1891, 26 Stat. 1097) the laws
on pre-emption (Chapter 4, Title 32, Rev. Stat. of 1878)
were repealed except sections 2275, 2276 and 2286. This
repe.aling act provided that all bona fide pre-emptive
claims which had been initiated, may be perfected upon
due compliance with law.
The act of July 16, 1894 (28 Stat. 107) was: "An
act to enable the people of Utah to form a constitution
and State government and to be admitted into the Union
on an equal footing with the original States." Section 6
of this Enabling Act (published page 64, Vol 1, U.C.A.
'53) provided :
"That upon the admission of said State into
the Union, sections numbered two, sixteen, thirtytwo, and thirty-six in every township of said
proposed state, and where such sect~ons, or any
parts thereof have been sold or otherwise disposed of by or under the authority of any Act of
Congress, other lands equivalent thereto, in legal
subdivisions of not less than one quarter section
and .as contiguous as may be to the section in lieu
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of which the same is taken, are hereby granted
to said State for the support of common schools,
such indemnity lands to be selected within said
State in such manner as the legislature may provide, with the approval of the Secretary of the
Interior: ... "
On February 26, 1859 Congress passed the statutory provision concerning pre-emptive rights on school
lands:
"Where settlements, with a view to pre-emption, have been made before the survey of the
lands in the field, which are found to have been
made on sections sixteen or thirty-six, those sections shall be subject to the pre-emption claim of
such settler; and if they, or either of them, have
been or shall be reserved or pledged for the use
of schools or colleges in the State or Territory
in which the lands lie, other lands of like quantity
are appropriated in lieu of such as may be patented by pre-emptors ... " (26 Feb. 1859, 11 Stat.
385; Sec. 2275, Rev. Stat. 1878; slightly revised
and republished in 43 U.S.C.A. Sec. 851)
Plaintiff's entire claim to title is based upon this
provision; he contends that he is the successor of D.
Hendrix, who settled on the land with a Yiew to preemption.
To review the 1natter chronologically; the pre-emption law of 1841 reserved school lands from the operation
of that act; in 1850 the Organic Act reserved Section 16
for school purposes in the lTtah Territory; we assume
(for the purpose of the motion for surmnary judgment)
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that in 1855 D. Hendrix was a settler with a view to preemption who inhabited and improved the tract involved;
in 1856 the official survey of the area w.as filed and accepted; hence at that time the location of the boundary
lines of section 16 became known; in 1859 Congress provided for lieu land selections by the Territory where
settlements with a view to pre-emption had been made
on sections 16 or 36 before the survey of the lands in
the field, and in 1843 and 1862 sections 2265 and 2266
respectively of the Revised Statutes of 1878 were passed
which required the pre-emption claimant in all cases to
file his declaratory statement within three months from
the filing date of the township plat.
This is the identical sequence of events ruled upon
m Gonzales v. French, decided by the Supreme Court
of the United States in 1896, 164 U.S. 338, 17 S. Ct. 102
41 L. ed. 458. Emma Gonzales claimed to be the owner
of a 120 acre tract forming part of section 16, T. 21 N.,
R. 7 E., of the Gila and Salt River Meridian (in Flagstaff,
Arizona). The pertinent facts, as stated by the court,
were:
"In 1878 a survey in the field was made of
the township in which the lands in dispute were
situated, which survey, together with a plat of
the same, was approved February 3, 1879. At the
time of the survey McMillan and Farriner were
residing on and cultivating lands constituting a
portion of section 16, and in 1883 Emma J. Gonzales, the plaintiff in error, purchased from said
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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occupants their improvements, took possession of
the land, and errected additional improvements
thereon." (emphasis added)
Although this school section was reserved (but not
granted) to the Territory, Congress in 1889 granted the
South Half of Section 16, to probate Judge French to
hold said lands as a townsite, in trust for the occupants
of the town of Flagstaff. ~Irs. Gonzales protested the
action of the local land officers in allowing Judge
French's entry and after fruitless appeals to the General
Land Office and to the Secretary of Interior, she sued
to quiet title in the courts. The U.S. Supreme Court held:
"The claim of the plaintiff in error, therefore, to a right of pre-emption, was fatally defective because her vendors and predecessors in
title had failed to make or file an actual entry
in the proper land office. As they did not choose
to assert their rights by filing a declaratory stateJnent, or by making an entry as pre-emptioners,
their 1nere possession did not prerent the rights
of t.Jz.e territory from attaching to the school sections 1chen the sttrvey 1cas made. Xor did the
plaintiff in error lawfully succeed to any possessory rights they may have had, as against the
lTnited States, because such rights were merely
personal to the settler, and, under lT. S. Rev. Stat.
Sec. 2263, were not assignable to the plaintiff in
error. She did not herself, after taking possession,
comply with the requisitions of the law.
"Section 2265, Revised Statutes, provides
that 'every clain1ant under the pre-e1nption law for
land not yet proclai1ned for sale is required to
1nake known his clain1 in writing to the register
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of the proper land office within three months from
the time of the settlement, giving the designation
of the tract and the time of settlement; otherwise
his claim shall be forfeited and the tract awarded
to the next settler, in the order of time, on the
same tract of land, who has given such notice and
otherwise complied with the conditions of the law;'
and Sec. 2266 provides that 'in regard to settlements which .are authorized upon unsurveyed
lands, the preemption claimant shall be in all
cases required to file his declaratory statement
within three months from the date of the receipt
at the district land office of the approved plat
of the township embracing such pre-emption settlement;' and section 2267 provides that 'all claim.ants of pre-emption rights, under the two preceding sections, shall, when no shorter time is prescribed by law, make the proper proof and payment for the lands claimed within thirty months
after the date prescribed therein, respectively, for
filing their declaratory notice, has expired.'
"The bill discloses that the plaintiff in error
first appeared in the land office and proposed to
file her declaratory statement on April 2, 1885,
more than six years after the filing of the plat.
"The register and receiver were therefore
warranted in rejecting the claim of the plaintiff
in error."
The above quoted decision conclusively bars plaintiff's complaint to quiet title. The principle therein announced was subsequently declared to be the law in
rtah. In Rio Grande Western Railway Company v.
Stringham et al., 38 Utah 113, 110 Pac. 868, the facts
were as follows:
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In 1870 George Stringham, and Dorr Curtis settled
upon unsurveyed public lands west of Sandy, Utah. In
1873 the lands were surveyed and the plat was filed in
the Land Office in August, 1874. In 1873 the Bingham
Canyon and Camp Floyd Railroad built its road from
Sandy to Bingham, and in 1875 and 1876, a copy of the
articles of incorporation and a profile .and map of the
road were filed with the Secretary of the Interior. No
declaratory statement announcing his intention to obtain
patent under the pre-emptive laws was filed by Stringham untill 1883. Some time later the Rio Grande R. R.
acquired the Bingham and Camp Floyd R. R. and a quiet
title suit was prosecuted. The opinion states:
"It is contended that the decisive questions
on the .appeal are : (1) Were the lands in question, and upon and across which plaintiff's predecessor constructed its road, public lands when
it filed its articles of incorporation with the Secretary of the Interior, and its profile and map
with the register of the district land office, and
undertook to avail itself of the benefits of the
actf'

* * *
"Curtis filed no declaratory statement, and
made no entry in the land office. He sold his
possessory rights to George Stringham in 1875.
Stringham filed no declaratory statement, and
made no entry in the land office until the 12th
day of June, 1883. These claimants failing to
assert their rights by the filing of a declaratory
statement, or by 1naking an entry as pre-emptors,
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within the prescribed time after the receipt at
the district land office of the township plat, acquired no prior rights by virtue of their settlement and occupancy, and their failure to file such
declaratory statements left the lands subject to
disposition by the United States as before their
occupancy.
"The Supreme Court of the United States, in
the case of Buxton v. Traver, 130 U.S. 232, 9 Sup.
Ct. 509, 32 L. ed. 920, held that a settlement upon
public lands in .advance of a public survey is al' lowed to parties who, in good faith, intend, when
the surveys are made and returned to the local
land office, to apply for their purchase; and, when
the public surveys are made and returned, the
land, not having been in the meantime withdrawn,
c.an be acquired and purchased by them by the
filing of a declaratory statement within the time
and by pursuing the steps prescribed by law.
The court there said: 'If those steps are from
any cause not taken, the proffer of the government has not been accepted, and a title in the occupant is not even initiated. The title to the land
remains unaffected, and subject to the control
and disposition of the government, as before his
occupancy. This doctrine has been long established in this court.' To the same effect are Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v DeLacey, 174 U.S. 622, 19
Sup. Ct. 791, 43 L. ed. 1111 ; Gonzales v. French,
164 U. S. 338, 17 Sup. Ct. 102, 41 L. ed. 548;
Osborne v. Altschul (C.C.), 101 Fed. 739. We
therefore say that the lands in question were
public lands when plaintiff's predecessor, in 1875,
filed its articles of incorporation with the Secretary of the Interior, and when the profile and

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
map of its road were filed by it in the district
land office, and approved by the Secretary of
the Interior on the 20th day of October, 1876."
A landmark case concerning the necessity of the
pre-emptive claimant filing a declaratory statement of
intention to obtain patent is that of Frisbie vs. Whitney,
9 Wall. 187, 19 L. ed. 668. The holding of that case is
that occupation and improvement of the public lands with
a view to pre-emption does not confer a vested right in
the land occupied, nor a right against the government.
A vested right under the pre-emption laws is obtained
only when the purchase money has been paid, and the
receipt of the proper land officer given to the purchaser;
and until this is done, such lands are under the control of
Congress.
The only case which plaintiff cites and claims to bPcontr.ary to the above decisions is Hamblin vs. State
Board of Land Commissioners, 55 Utah 402, 187 Pac. 178.
In that case a survey in 1918 of lands near Kanab, l~tah
revealed that plaintiff Han1blin's improvements and
cultivated acreage were on state, school lands. His predecessors in title had been there for forty years, so pursuant to Utah law (65-1-31 U.C.A. 1953) Hamblin had
his Salt Lake attorney prepare an .application to purchase his tract from the State Land Board. This application was delivered in the 1nail to I\::anosh rather than
l{an.ab which caused his subsequent application to be delayed and denied because not filed '•within ninety days
after thP plats of said SUITeys haYe been filed in the
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United States Land Office." Mr. Hamblin brought an
original writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court of
Utah to compel the granting of his tardy application.
This court held that the writ of mandamus would not
lie to compel the Land Board to perform a discretionary
function, inasmuch as the statute provided that the settler
"may be permitted" to purchase such lands. Without any
reference to its prior Railroad v. Stringham decision the
court stated that the ninety days filing provision was
the same as the federal requirement and that:
"In construing the section of the act of Congress above quoted, (Sec. 2266 Rev. Stat. 1878)
as far as we have been able to ascertain, the courts
have uniformly held it to be directory only. The
cases in mind have all arisen between conflicting
claimants, and where there were no intervening
rights as in the case at bar." (Emphasis added)
Plaintiff deleted the last sentence, above italicized,
from his brief, for the Landsdale vs. Daniels decision, 100
U. S. 113, 25 L. ed. 587, quoted in the Hamblin case states
that a filing subsequent to the three month period:
" ... is held to be operative and sufficient unless
some other person had previously commenced a
settlement and given the required notice of claim.
Johnson vs. Towsley, 13 Wall, 72, 91, 20 L. ed.
485, 489.
The Johnson vs. Towsley decision is cited with approval in Gonzales vs. French and these cases interpreted together say in effect that if intervening rights
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should attach to the land the failure of the pre-emptive
claimant to make his declaratory statement within the
three month period, is fatal to perfecting the possessory
right. Thus in the Hamblin case, there were no intervening rights and the three months proviso was stated to
be directory and not mandatory while in Gonzales vs.
French and Railroad vs. Stringham the title of the intervenor was held paramount to the unperfected pre-emptive claim.
The result is that where plaintiffs' predecessors in
interest, D. Hendrix and John Prye et al., filed no declaratory statement whatsoever, the land, being a school
section was reserved to the Territory of Utah under th~
Organic Act, the date the survey was filed (Sept. 10,
1856), and was granted to the State under section six
of the Enabling Act of 1894. The State Land Board
patented the property to Romney Lumber Comp.any in
1943 and it was not untill\fay 6, 1952 that Rennold Pen-

der filed the first and only application that has ever
been made with the Bureau of Land l\fanagement. This
was 97 years after D. Hendrix was first (assumed to be)
in possession. Because of such intervening rights this
application was properly rejected and plaintiff has no
better position before the courts.
As stated in Gonzales vs. French:
"As they did not choose to assert their rights
by filing .a declaratory statement, or by Inaking
an entry as pre-emptioners, their n1ere possession
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did not prevent the rights of the territory from
attaching to the school sections when the survey
was made."
Similarly in Ferry vs. Street, 4 Utah 521, 11 Pac.
571, the Supreme Court of Utah said:
"The decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States establish the following propositions
of law: First. That the various acts of Congress
mentioned reserving portions of the public lands
of the United States to the territories or states
for the benefit of their people, vest the title of
such lands so reserved in the territories or states
when the lands are surveyed, or when they are
bounded and ascertained." (4 Utah at page 537)
Other decisions which hold that title to the school
section is reserved to the Territory once the survey is
accomplished are Dugan v. Montoya, 24 N. Mex. 102, 173
Pac. 118; Union Pacific R. Co. v. Douglas, 31 Fed. 540;
Union Pacific R. Co. v. Karges, 169 Fed. 459; Magnolia
Petroleum Company v. Price, 86 Okla. 105, 206 Pac. 1033.
The lands involved in the instant action were reserved to the Territory of Utah under section 15 of the
Organic Act (see page 8 of this brief), and granted
to the state under section 6 of the Enabling Act (July 16,
1894; 28 Stat. 107). No other conclusion can be reached.
The fact that other settlers did file the required declaration of intent, and received federal patent to other portions of section 16, T. 1 S., R. 1 E., only shows that compliance with the pre-emption requirements w.as rewarded
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with legal title but in cases of non-compliance the state
was not required to make lieu selections and its patent
was valid.
A further study of the laws on pre-emption show that
a pre-emptive right to obtain patent was personal and
such right could not be assigned or transferred. Sec.
2259 of the Revised Statutes (1878) states:
"Every person, being the head of a family
. who has made, or hereafter makes, a settlement in person on the public lands subject to preemption, and who inhabits and improves the
same . . . " (is entitled to a pre-emptive right)
( 4 Sept. 1841; 5 Stat. 455)
Section 2262 of the pre-emption laws provides that
the claimant must take an oath:
" . . . that he has not settled upon and improved
such land to sell the same on speculation, but in
good faith to appropriate it to his own exclusive
use ... " ( 4 Sept. 1841; 5 Stat. 456)
In section 2258 it is declared that lands shall not
be subject to rights of pre-emption that are:
" ... actually settled and occupied for purposes
of trade and business, and not for agriculture."
(4 Sept. 1841; 5 Stat. 455)

The lmc is explicit that n.o assignment of the prerntJdli'C ri.1ht may be made.
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Sec. 2263:
"Prior to any entries being made under and
by virtue of the provisions of section 2259, proof
of the settlement and improvement thereby required shall be made to the satisfaction of the
register and receiver of the land district in which
such lands lie, agreeably to such rules as may be
prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior; and
all assignments and transfers of the right hereby
secured, prior to the issuing of t·h:e patent, shall
be null and void." (Emphasis added) ( 4 Sept.
1841; 5 Stat. 456).
See the language in Gonzales vs. French that an assignee
has no standing as a pre-emptive clain1ant. It might just
as easily be assumed that John Prye was informed by
the officials of the District Land Office that the land was
a known school section, and he being an assignee could
not succeed in obtaining patent to said tract.
The court can readily understand why the Bureau of
Land l\1an.agement rejected plaintiff's application for
patent where he was not the original personal settler
upon the lands, but is an assignee, and an extremely
remote one at best.
Furthermore, plaintiff has admitted, pursuant to
defendant's request that he is the owner of more than
320 .acres of land in the State of Utah. (R. 45, 46) Sections 2260 and 2262 (Rev. Stat. 1878) declare that a person shall not be eligible to obtain a pre-emptive right:
" ... who is the proprietor of three hundred and
twenty acres of land in any state or territory."
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POINT II.
PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION FOR PATENT FROM THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WAS REJE.CTED BY THE
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT AND THIS ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION IS BINDING UPON PLAINTIFF AND
UPON THIS COURT.

On May 6, 1952 the same date the complaint was
filed, plaintiff prosecuted .an application to obtain a
patent from the United States of America. This application was rejected.
The affidavit of Mr. House (R. 50, 51) states that
on July 9, 1952 1Ir. Pender was notified of the decision
of the Bureau of Land 1Ianagement, rejecting his application for patent, and that no appeal was taken from
such decision. A copy of the letter notifying Mr. Pender
that the lands had been granted to the State of Utah as
a school section is attached to Mr. House's affidavit.
(R. 52)
The Rules and Regulations of the Bureau of Land
l\1anagement provide as follows:
Section 221.50 (b) "Upon failure to serve
and file notice of appeal as provided in Sections
221.47 to 221.49 the case will be closed."
Section 221.51 (a) .. "\Yhen any party fails
to move for a new trial or to appeal from the
decision of the n1anager within the time specified,
such decision shall, as to such p.arty. be final and
will not lH' disturbed except in case of fraud or
gross irregularity.''
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These regulations are published in 43 Code of Federal Regulations and are required to be judicially noticed.
44 U.S.C.A. Sec. 307. See also 78-25-1, U.C.A. '53.
By virtue of the last-above regulations the administrative action of the Bure:au of Land Management in
rejecting plaintiff's application for patent is binding upon
the plaintiff and upon this court. This principle of administrative law has been widely recognized by the courts
and is stated in Gonzales vs. French as follows:
"The bill discloses that the plaintiff in error
first appeared in the land office and proposed to
file her declaratory statement on April 2, 1885,
more than six years after the filing of the plat.
"The register and receiver were therefore
warranted in rejecting the claim of the plaintiff
in error. And, at any rate, as she did not appeal
from their decision to the Commissioner of the
General Land Office, she must be deemed to have
acquiesced therein, and is concluded thereby so
long as it remains unreversed. Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S.13 Pet. 511 (10:270)."
The above stated rule was also cited with approval by
the Supreme Court of Utah in Railroad v. Stringham,
38 Utah, at 120:
"We think that the Secretary of Interior,
when he received and accepted the articles of incorporation of plaintiff's (railroad) predecessor,
and approved the profile of its road filed with
the register of" the District Land Office, determined the question now under consideration. By
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such acceptance and approval, the Secretary necessarily determined that the act did apply. Thris
is not a proper proceeding nor forum to review
that ruling." (Emphasis added.)
Other decisions which announce the rule that an
adrninistrative determination upon the facts cannot be

I:

reviewed in a court of law are U.S. v. Throckmorton, 98
U.S. 61, 25 L. ed. 93; Ross v. Day, 232 U.S. 110, 34 S. Ct.
233, 58 L. ed. 528; Johnson v. Riddle, 240 U.S. 467, 36 S.

Ct. 393, 60 L. ed. 752; Reed v. St. Paul M. & M. Ry. Co.,
234 Fed. 207; Pierson v. State Board of Land Corn'rs., 14

Idaho 159, 93 Pac. 775 and Ross v. Wright, 29 Old. 186,
116 P.ac. 949. For a very interesting and unusual appli-

I

I

cation of the rule concerning the binding effect of a decision of the Bureau of Land management see In Re W o-

Gin-Up's Estate, 57 Utah 29, 192 Pac. 267.
Mr. House, having custody of the official tract book
which showed no pre-emptive claiin ever having been
entered, ruled upon the basis of such fact that plaintiff's
contention of pre-en1ptive right could not possibly operate in .any 1nanner to upset the sale of the tract by the
Sate Land Board under its regular procedure. There

J

has been no allegation seeking relief against fraud or

~

rnistake. No appeal having been taken by plaintiff from
the rejection of his application, the decision of the dep.artrnent is conclusive upon him.
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POINT III.
PLANTIFF CANNOT OBTAIN TITLE TO THE SCHOOL
SECTION BY ADVERSE POSSESSION AGAINST THE
UNITED STATES OR THE STATE OF UTAH.

The following cases are cited to button up any contention that plaintiff might have some factual basis to
title on the theory of adverse possession, or other such
grounds for reversal of the decree quieting the school
board's title.
It is axiomatic that title by adverse possession cannot
be .acquired against the United States. Jourdan v. Barrett, -1 How. 169, (U.S.) 11 L. Ed. 924; Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall 92, (U.S.) 20 L. ed. 534; Bode v. Rollwitz,
60 :Mont. 481, 199 Pac. 688; Boglino v. Giorgetta, 20 Colorado Appeals 338, 78 Pac. 612; United States v. Eldredge,
33 F. Supp. 337.

And in Van lVagoner v. Whitmore, 58 Utah 418, 199
Pac. 670, the Supreme Court of Utah held that title by
adverse possession could not be acquired to a school section as .against the state. The following headnote correctly reflects the adjudication of that case:
"Title to land granted to the state by the
Enabling Act (Act Cong. July 16, 1894), for the
support of the common schools in the state, cannot be acquired by adverse possession as against
the state under Comp. Laws 1917 § 6446, G-t--1:7,
6449, 6450 (seven ye.ar statute of limitations on
adverse possession) in view of section 10 of the
Enabling Act, and in view of Const. Art. 10, § 3,
Art. 20 § 1, though the state sold the land under
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

26
section 5575, such statutes of limitation having no
application to land granted by Congress for the
support of common schools."
On page 18 of his brief, plaintiff infers that he has
been an adverse holder of this tract of land for more
than 20 years. The brief states that plaintiff: " ... can,
of course, proceed under Section 1068 United States Code
Annotated, as amended (Title 43) to secure title ... "
This act provides that the Secretary of the Interior shall
issue a patent:
"
whenever it shall be shown to his satisfaction that a tract of public land has been held
in good faith and in peaceful, adverse, possession
by a claimant, his ancestors or grantors, under
claim or color of title for more than twenty years,
and that valuable improvements have been placed
on such land or some part thereof has been reduced to cultivation."
Plaintiff has nez;er been in possession, or held this
land in good faith for any length of time u:hatsoever.
He has never placed valuable improvements on such land
nor cultivated one square foot of it. See plaintiff's Answers To Defendant's Request For Ad1nission Of Facts
at page 45 and 46 of the Judgment Roll. Plaintiff goes

so far as to contend that his residence at 6721\Iilton Ave.
somehow rneans in a broad sense that he ''i11habits" this
tract.
Hine<' the date of the issuance of state patent to Romney Lu1nber Comp,any, it has paid all taxes assessed
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against the property (R. 33) and has paid for all curb,
gutter, sidewalk and sewer improvements that have been
made. So far as defendant's counsel is informed, said
property is vacant.
POINT IV.
THE STATE PATENT TO ROMNEY LUMBER COMPANY AND PAYMENT OF TAXES BY IT BARS PLAINTIFF FROM OBTAINING TITLE BY ADVERSE POSSESSION AGAINST SAID PATENTEE.

Just in case plaintiff contends that he has acquired
title by adverse possession against Romney Lumber Co.
since the state patented the property to it in 1943, defendant has had Ensign Abstract Company prepare a certificate under date of September 23, 1955, which report of
the assessment and payment of gener.al taxes for the
years 1943 to 1954 shows that all taxes and special assessments have been paid by Romney Lumber Company. (R.
53 to 60 inclusive.)
Section 78-12-7, U.C.A. 1953, provides:
"In every action for the recovery of real property, or the possession thereof, the person establishing a legal title to the property shall be presumed to have been possessed thereof within the
time required by law; . . ."
Hence the patentee, Romney Lumber Company, rnust
be presumed to have been in possession since the date of
patent August 7, 1943.
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Furthermore, section 78-12-12 U.C.A. 1953 states:
"In no case shall adverse possession be considered established under the provisions of any
section of this Code, unless it shall be shown that
the land has been occupied and claimed for the
period of seven years continuously, and that the
party, his predecessors and grantors have paid all
taxes which have been levied and assessed upon
such land according to law." (Emphasis .added.)
Defendant Board of Education of Salt Lake City has only
cited these statutes and presented an abstract of the
assessment rolls showing payment of all taxes by Romney Lumber Company to show to the court that there is
no possible issue of fact concerning the establishment of
title by adverse possession by plaintiff. Neither Rennold
Pender, nor his predecessors in interest could have acquired title by adverse possession against either of the
sovereign titleholders, the United States of America or
the State of Utah, .and the payment of taxes by defendant's grantor precludes the possibility of acquisition of
title by adverse possession against the individual patentee
of the State of Utah.
CONCLlTSION
Assuming all farts as clailned by plaintiff, no issues
.are thereby rai8ed, not disposable under the pre-e1nption
laws. The 1notion for sun1mary judgment was properly
grantPd and the decree quieting defendant's title should
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be affirmed by this court. The sum1nary judgment procedure contained in the new rules has provided an expedient means of disposing of vexatious litigation.
Equitably speaking, Emma Gonzales .and Thomas
B. Stringham stood in a far better position than the
plaintiff herein. But it has been a policy of the law from
earliest times that an enfeoffment of some sort be required to indicate in whom the fee simple was vested.
Here the very practical and necessary act was to timely
file a declaratory statement of pre-emptive claim in
the district land office. The failure to do so, was, no
doubt, costlier to Gonzales and Stringham than in the
instant case. There can be no question about the outcome
of this action in view of the decisions in those two c.ases.
The Decree should be affirmed with costs awarded
to this respondent.
Respectfully submitted,
MARR, WILKINS & CANNON
RICHARD H. NEBEKER
Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

